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Abstract: 
 
This paper explores the impact that extreme weather events can have on communities. Using the Brisbane 
floods of 2011 to examine the recovery operations, the paper highlights the effectiveness of recovery and re-
building in already strong and resilient communities.  
Our research has shown that communities which have a strong sense of identity, as well as organized plac-
es to meet, develop resilient networks that come into play in times of crisis. The increasing trend of the 
fly-in/fly-out (FIFO) or drive-in/drive-out (DIDO) workforce to service regional areas has undermined the 
resilience of existing communities. The first hint of this occurs with community groups not knowing who 
their neighbours are.  
The paper is based on research examining the needs of groups in regional communities with the goal to 
better equip regional communities with the capacity to respond positively to change (and crisis) through in-
novative, evidence-based policies, resilience strategies and tools. Part of this process was to build an evi-
dence-base to address a range of challenges associated with the place-based environments and the sharing of 
information systems within communities and decision makers. 
The first part of the paper explores the context in which communities have been required to mobilize in 
response to crises; the issues that have galvanized a common purpose; and the methods by which these 
communities shared their knowledge. 
The second part of the paper examines how communities could plan for and mitigate natural disasters in 
the future by developing better decision making tools. 
The paper defines the requirements for information systems that will link data models of built infrastruc-
ture with data from the disaster and response plans. These will then form the basis for the use of social media 
to coordinate activities between official crews and the public to improve response coordination and provide 
the technology that could reduce the time required to allow communities to resume some semblance of nor-
mality. 
 
   Key Words : Regional Communities, regional resilience, placemaking, social  networks, flooding events, 
Brisbane  
 
 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
The backdrop for this conference must surely be the record and extreme floods in Queensland in January 
2011. Declared the largest natural disaster in the history of Australia this flooding event brought the four pil-
lars of the QLD economy – tourism, agriculture, mining and industry/manufacturing – to a complete stand-
still [for a while at least]. Not only did the floods engulf  75% of the State of Queensland (approx 1.29 mil-
lion square kilometres), they also devasted homes and businesses, severed critical infrastructure, rearranged 
railway lines and cut access and electricity to numerous capital and regional cities. 
Though these events are not unique to Australia, the scale and severity of these weather events are be-
coming increasing difficult to recover from. Current planning and land-use practices have proved insufficient 
in allowing communities to first prepare for, then manage, these events, leaving high levels of destruction 
after each flooding event.  Unless a city already has the capacity to be resilient in crisis, it will take longer to 
recover from major disruptions similar to those we have seen first hand in Brisbane in January 2011 and in 
Gladstone in 2013. The definition of resilience that has been adopted here is taken from the Stockholm Re-
search Institute that describes resilience as ‘the capacity for a system to continually change and adapt yet 
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remain within critical thresholds’.  This particular approach supports the interconnected relationships be-
tween cities, environments, and people; believing that a better understanding of these relationships will drive 
innovation and production towards more sustainable and resilient cities in the long term. The UK’s Draft 
Strategic National Framework for Community Resilience, explains this interdepency; ‘We rely on complex 
and interdependent infrastructure to go about our daily lives. Food supply chains reach across the globe and 
movement of people and animals create opportunities for diseases to spread quickly. Transport networks en-
able us to move around with relative ease and independence. Our ability to live day to day relies on these 
systems operating efficiently. The consequences of emergencies are demonstrated by the impacts on the in-
frastructure we rely on.’ (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2010).  
During these moments of crisis it is the absolute will and cohesion of the community that will drive the 
recovery and clean-up process. We witnessed just how effective this community-driven clean-up was across 
Brisbane over two weeks immediately after the flood. It is this idea of community resilience that this paper 
will examine in the context of the recent SEQ flooding events, before exploring the type of information sys-
tems that would underpin better preparation and decision making before, during and after these extreme 
weather events. 
 
(2) THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY? 
Despite 75% of Australia’s export earnings being generated in regional areas, the benefits of the recent 
boom are unevenly distributed with many regional communities bearing a high proportion of burdens, such 
as soaring housing costs, stretch on infrastructure and drain of transport corridors and local services  (Car-
rington, Hogg, 2011). In the past townships and communities went hand in hand with economic develop-
ment, particularly those supporting mining speculation. We observe the benefits of investment in civic, cul-
tural and social infrastructure in regional centres like Bendigo, Ballarat, Charters Towers or even Mount Isa, 
from with their respective booms. ‘The prosperity of these town relied upon the combined efforts of commu-
nities, resource companies, workers and their families. The mine could not survive without workers and the 
town could not survive without the mine.’ (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional 
Australia, 2013) However, since the 1980s, and under the growing influence of global economic forces, mul-
tinational companies in agriculture and mining have increasingly relied on transient workforces to meet their 
demands,which despite many resource companies attempt to ‘give back’, can have a detrimental impact on 
the community. 
The need to supply the work force demands of regional areas has seen a surge in ‘fly-in/fly-out’ (FIFO) 
and ‘drive-in/drive-out’ (DIDO) delivery of shift workers. This is where workers still live with their families 
in their city of origin and commute over long distances to their work place. This is feasible as the workers 
generally work 12 hour shifts over long periods, such as two weeks on and one week off. The workers sleep 
in specially built “villages” which are often isolated from the permanent community. The advantage to the 
employer is the reduction in accommodation provision by comparison with building new townships for fami-
lies, with schools, shoppings, etc. The advantage to the workers is that their family does not need to leave 
their local environment, friends, partners’ employment, etc. The downside are high levels of social disloca-
tion and widening family relationship issues. It is not uncommon for someone to live in northern Queensland 
and work in northern Western Australia, commuting more than 5000 kms to go to and from work. While not 
a new phenomenon, the scale of the enterprise has exceeded all precedent. This in turn has impacted on local 
communities in a variety of ways – not least the lack of investment in place-based social and cultural infra-
structure. In contrast, the City of Mt Isa in north Queensland is celebrating its 90 year anniversary of settle-
ment this year. This city was established primarily to support Mt Isa Mines (Xstrata Copper and Zinc), who 
in turn, invested in the community and social infrastructure over the last 90 years leaving a rich legacy. With 
the workforce largely supplied by the city, the strength of both the community and the mine prospered. 
More recently, rapid expansions in the mining sector and new companies around Mt Isa have seen the de-
mand outstrip local supply increasing the FIFO/DIDO work force. Frequent flight services to remote regions 
and the attractions of living in major citites have enticed even locally-based workers and families to adopt 
the remote live/work model. For example, one typical local family from Mt Isa had all four family members 
contributing to the economy of that city: the father was employed at the mine; the mother managed the local 
bank; and the two teenage children worked part-time in Macdonalds and Hungry Jacks after school. When 
the mine increased their operations the family elected to move to Brisbane permanently leaving Mt Isa with 3 
employees short. This story is not uncommon in many mining towns. The scenarios might vary slightly but 
the pattern remains the same – the migration of skill workers and valuable community leaders to the cities in 
exchange for long term shift work.  
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In some locations where FIFO is newly emerging, local workers are being dismissed, while FIFO workers 
from places such as PNG are being brought in, which combined with the current industry downturn is mak-
ing finding employment in places like Gunnedah and Singleton a real challenge for locals.  Singleton resi-
dent Kelly Bates portrays the impact this will have on the close community; ‘People aren't gonna - they're not 
gonna be able to get the jobs because they're gonna be taken from them with these fly-in, fly-out people, so it's 
gonna diminish. There's gonna be nobody here.’ (ABC 7:30 Report, 27/05/2013)This has obvious implications for 
the towns population long-term. 
With the FIFO expansion, both resource dependent and high amenity areas have contributed to a rapid in-
crease in demand for housing in regional Australia. Housing affordability remains an acute problem for these 
boom communities in Queensland and Western Australia (Carrington & Pereira, 2011; Haslam et al., 2009). 
The tendancy for mining companies to subsidise the accommodation of even their resident workforce further 
exacerbates this problem.  
The rapidly constructed housing units (known as ‘dongas’) built to accommodate the transient workforce 
have had a range of adverse impacts on regional communities (Carrington, 2011; Lawrie et al., 2011).  The 
camps are designed to house single persons and are often planned for short term accommodation only; plac-
ing a considerable burden on local transport corridors, infrastructure and human services. These services 
which are usually funded on the basis of the permanent resident population and exclude non-resident workers 
who reside in these camps and benefit from the infrastructure. In Queensland’s Bowen Basin, for example 
the non-resident population housed in temporary accommodation grew by 40 per cent in the 12 months to 
July 2011 to 20,520 (OESR 2012). An ever-decreasing permanent resident workforce carries major implica-
tions for the sustainability of traditional regional communities (Gallegos 2005).  
The existing housing shortage, along with the increased demands of FIFO, have also had serious impacts 
on regional tourism. With many exisiting hotels in resource intensive regions being booked up by the mines 
to secure accommodation for their transient FIFO workforce, hotels are no longer open and available for 
tourists. The rates of available rooms have also been driven up by the higher rates that the mines have nego-
tiated for full board and lodging – consequently tourism also suffers. 
 
(3) THREATS TO THE COMMUNITY RESILIENCE 
While regional towns and mining centres cannot compete with the major cities for opportunities and 
amenties, these communities cannot withstand such levels of attrition and survive. Community members 
hold local knowledge about the area, their culture and their histories. With every migration the concentration 
of that community is weakened. A transient FIFO workforce is a largely unknown entity to an existing 
community – one that is constantly changing and evolving.  
The first threat to community resilience can be directly attributed to this ‘unknown’, with many locals de-
scribing an ‘us and them’ attitude which ‘in some circumstances can lead directly to social disorder’ (House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia, 2013, p. 46) In the words of Singleton Resi-
dent Julie Bailey ‘Well, obviously we don't want it here. Like, we don't want all these people, these strangers liv-
ing on our doorstep.’ (ABC 7:30 Report, 27/05/2013). 
The FIFO work force arrive by plane and are taken straight to the mine for the start of their two week stint 
of  twelve hours shifts. They are accommodated in contained housing estates (villages or camps) most often 
outside of the existing towns and cities, with no simple means of travelling to the “permanent” town even if 
they wanted to. One FIFO worker employed in Moranbah has been to the main town on a total of 2 occasions 
in her 7 months of employment, citing long hours and the distance from the camp to the town as the main 
reasons. As the mining companies are accountable for delivering a safe work environment, they employ a 
zero tolerance policy on alcohol and drugs after hours. These camps supply all meals and recreation so that 
the miners are further discouraged from socialising in the towns after hours.  
Our early research has shown that those communities who have a strong sense of identity as well as the 
opportunity to meet physically in convenient places, are better equipped to deal with crisis or change. If you 
don’t know your neighbours, and you don’t meet them in the town, how can you relate to them or help them 
in times of a crisis? If you don’t share public transport to get to work, or have families in the town or chil-
dren at the local schools – all the immediate mechanisms for sharing information and building resilient 
communities are removed. The FIFO workforce are an essential part of the fabric of the town but don’t par-
ticipate in advancement. 
This trend has become evident in the ‘ chronic shortage of volunteer community services such as charities, 
sporting clubs and rural fire brigades’ present in FIFO mining areas (Knox, 2012, p. 71), with The Australian 
Government’s report on FIFO revealing that residents were ‘unable to field sporting teams, provide coaches 
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for kids sport or run the Rotary club because they are unable to fill volunteer rosters’. (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia, 2013, p. 51) . This same report goes on to link 
volunteering as key to building social capital within communities. (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Regional Australia, 2013, p. 52). Long hours and proximity to towns are again a key concern 
for allowing FIFO to participate in the local community, however in this instance, what is more concerning is 
the dimishing local populations who would previously have sustained these types of community iniatives.  
The ‘National Strategy for Disaster Relief’ (National Emergency Management Committee, 2009) outlines 
several criteria for a ‘Disaster Resilient Community’. Of particular importance to this discussion is that 
‘People work together with local leaders using their knowledge and resources to prepare for and deal with 
disasters. They use personal and community strengths, and existing community networks and structures; a 
resilient community is enabled by strong social networks that offer support to individuals and families in a 
time of crisis.’ (National Emergency Management Committee, 2009, p. 5)While many mining companies 
made their employees available to assist with clean up efforts in regional locations such as Emerald, it is a 
tall order for FIFO workers to be able to achieve this level of connection with the community. 
 
The key question here is “how can transient workers learn more about the local community and interact with it in 
useful ways?” Building a sense of community and interdependence is a necessary part of preparedness for disaster re-
sponse. One contributing factor is an improved knowledge of the local community and environment through 
providing access to online information sources about the local community. Since employers also have a duty 
of care to their employees so that they can respond in the event of a disaster, shared systems to support re-
sponse and joint training of FIFO workers and locals can improve response when needed. 
 
(4) MOBILIZING THE COMMUNITY 
The issues that galvanise a community pivot around shared concerns and interests. During a crisis these 
interests come into sharp focus, enabling communities to mobilise. Information and threats are shared 
through news networks that assist or accelerate the speed of mobilization, but an essential ingredient to an 
effective gathering of people is a place to meet. This needs to be an indentifiable community place that might 
be both physical and virtual. If a virtual environment exists to build a sense of community and mutual inter-
dependence as suggested in the previous section, then this is the obvious place to provide access to disaster 
preparedness and response information and systems. 
Railway stations, community halls and local schools are ideal gathering places for large groups – either for 
marshalling, evacuation or for accommodating emergency shelter. They are easily identifiable public places 
that serve the community, often without political or religious alignment.   
Increasingly though, the places that engender effective community mobilization are virtual – situated in 
social networking sites like facebook and twitter, or even in government and community websites. This rapid 
transfer of shared information (including links to emergency and government websites) between multiple 
networks means that individual people can make better decisions about how they respond to change or crisis. 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of social media mobilization, the rapidly assembled ‘mud army’ of 25 
ooo community volunteers who responded to a call for community assistance by the Queensland State Gov-
ernment and the Brisbane City Council in the clean up after the 11 January 2011 floods: 
‘The January floods left Brisbane with a damage bill of $440 million. But as Lord Mayor Campbell New-
man said yesterday, “those volunteers saved us millions, absolute millions”. And they also allowed the city 
to achieve in three days, what took three months after the 1974 floods.’ These hoards of volunteers, having 
obtained information on times and locations from various forms of traditional and social media, gathered at 
prominent community locations such as the Doomben Racecourse in Brisbane. Here, they were given health 
and safety information, tetanus needles, sunscreen and the like, before being organized onto buses and de-
ployed into the community.  
This system, employing both physical and virtual places, was effective in conscripting strangers, establishing 
new networks of volunteers and coordinating the large scale of operations. Equally effective were the infor-
mal mud-armies who responded directly to family, friends and colleagues; and then contributed long after 
the official clean up was completed. One small business in Brisbane explains how strong social capital in 
their business community got them through the floods; ‘most were affected as well and came together to help 
one another. Having existing strong relationships with our staff,agent and clients helped a lot’. (Hartel & 
Latemore, 2011, p. 867). Many volunteers across Australia also provided professional and construction ser-
vices to affected areas (such as building, landscaping and architectural services).  
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While strong communities are precursor to resilience; access to accurate information and knowledge are 
necessary for resonding to crises. The information needs to be shared easily and quickly to all sectors. With 
energy supplies frequently knocked out by extreme weather events these information systems need to be ro-
bust enough to operate independently of centralized sources. Social media has significantly increased the 
reach to individuals, and the instantaneous updates that mobile devices offer in delivering and sharing that 
information is critical to the process. We suggest that better information and knowledge might be shared by 
combining data from numerous sources and communicating it through new interfaces and visualisation mod-
els – like a ‘digital workbench’. This facility could be used to build a sense of community under normal cir-
cumstances, while enabling local government agencies to have better access to real-time information com-
bined with evidence-based research in times of crisis.  
The ‘Mud Army’ would also have benefitted from a system of ‘instantaneous updates’ as they deployed 
around Brisbane. Some participants found that they spent several hours on a bus driving to various locations 
and waiting, before being sent to the next spot. ‘We spent a lot of time stationary on the bus, waiting for in-
structions to be given to our bus coordinators about where to go. They seemed confused and were being giv-
en old information as we repeatedly arrived at sites and were told to move on as they already had enough 
buses. This resulted in a bus full of very frustrated volunteers!’(Robertson, 2013). 
The need for this type of dissemination of up-to-date information during a crisis is evident in the work of 
some community members during floods in regional Queensland. Particularly when much of the official 
news coverage focused on the larger centres, locals in regional areas began to rely on eachother for updates. 
Andrew Hunter and Garret Wells initiated with Facebook pages ‘Rockhampton and CQ Flood Updates’ after 
the 2011 and 2010 floods respectively.(McBryde, 2011) The sites consolidate information from sources such 
as the Queensland Police, State Emergency Service and local councils, as well as provide a platform for 
community members to share up-to-date specific information about road closures and the like in the Central 
Queensland region.  
 
The following section describes a hypothetical IT system to support planning and response to disasters and 
to build resilience in communities. 
 
(5) BUILDING AN IT INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT PLANNING AND RESPONSE 
This discussion is built around four stages – avoidance, planning, response and rebuilding. We first de-
scribe typical use cases for each of these four stages and then present the proposed IT system architecture to 
support these use cases. 
The assets that may need to be protected include buildings, roads, bridges and engineering services (pow-
er, water, telecommunications, etc). Very few juridictions internationally would have information on all of 
these assets available in an integrated manner due to both organizational and technical issues. The organisa-
tional issues are due to the normal break up of responsibilities for infrastructure and buildings across differ-
ent organisations and across government and private sectors. Issues of privacy and intellectual proporty also 
mitigate against coordinated access to information. The technical issues include interoperability (the ability 
to merge data from disparate sources) and the filtering of data to support human understanding. 
The simplest way to reduce the impact of disasters is to avoid them in the first place. While this may not 
be possible with natural disasters there are many man-made disasters that could have been avoided if the 
warning signs had been heeded. A recent example is Bridge 9340 (I-35W Mississippi River bridge) (Wik-
ipedia, 2013) which collapsed on August 1st 2007, killing 13 people and injuring 145 people. The bridge was 
carrying a deadload greater than the designed load. The bridge had been inspected on numerous occasions 
and flagged as being “structurally deficient”. The bridge failed under construction loads during 
non-structural repairs to the bridge. Appropriate monitoring of the bridge under construction loads, including 
the installation of sensors to detect excessive deflections may have avoided the disaster. Planning to mini-
mise risk and impact at this level is within the control of the asset owner or their agents. The information on 
the asset that is needs to fulfill this function is a BIM model of the asset “as designed” and “as constructed” 
together with the results of the design analyses. A description of the designers intentions would also be 
helpful but is seldom requested or provided. 
In order to plan for resilience the community needs to know what assets it has, the importance of particular 
assets and the risks to these assets associated with expected events. Figure 1 shows the Brisbane CBD from 
the air. The Brisbane floods in 2011 were a major surprise mainly due to reassurances that the construction 
of the Wivenhoe Dam meant that there would never be a repeat of the 1974 floods. This lead to poor deci-
sions on risk assessment with key components of buildings (plant rooms, electrical sub-stations, etc) being 
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placed in basements. This meant the many buildings whose ground floor was above the maximum flood level 
were out of commission for months due to water damage to plant in their flooded basements. Above the sin-
gle building level, the same assurances on reduction of flood risk due to the Wivenhoe lead to many new de-
velopments being built in areas that were previously inundated in 1974 and inundated again in 2011. The 
difference in weather patterns between the 1974 and 2011 floods also meant that the implications of the 2011 
event were not appreciated as early as they may have been. Many people were woken on the night before the 
flood peak hit Brisbane and only given a few hours to leave. 
Keeping information on individual assets is relatively easy. When dealing with large numbers of assets 
with many distinct types creating and maintaining accurate information is a more difficult proposition. A 
holistic approach would require the integration of data about climate, topography, hydrology, engineering 
services (water, energy systems, transportation), structures (bridges, roads, etc) and buildings. The infor-
mation about these systems and assets does not need to be at the same level of detail as for the previous stage 
and would be unwieldly if it did. The level of information about buildings could be limited to the geometric 
representation of the external envelope and the floor levels inside the building with attributes giving the 
building usage(s), type of structure, etc. This type of system is being implemented in the Sydney CBD by the 
NSW Department of Finance & Services, Land & Property Information. The need for the Sydney CBD 
model has arisen through the need to coordinate all of the subterranean structures and services, such as the 
underground train lines, carparking structures and basements, services, etc. 
 
 
Figure 1: Understanding existing assets. An aerial image of the Brisbane CBD from Google Earth with 3D buildings. 
 
Many of the risks of disaster events for individual assets are covered automatically through legislation 
such as building codes and planning constraints. In both the Newcastle and Christchurch earthquakes the 
major death tolls occurred in multi-storey buildings which had been subject to extensive modifications over 
time with poor consideration of the structural impacts of modifications (Newcastle Herald, 2009; Wikipedia, 
2013a). While individual asset owners can reduce the impact of disasters on their own assets, they are con-
strained in how to respond to widespread events, such as floods and earthquakes. This is an obvious role for 
government. For example, the Brisbane City Council publishes flood flag maps (BCC, 2012) that can be 
used to assess the likelihood of flooding at a particular location. 
Response covers activities during an event and includes protection of lives, maintaining continuity of ser-
vices, protection of public and private assets and immediate cleanup to enable return to normal operation for 
those people and assets not directly effected. Most of this is the responsibility of government. The response 
planners will require immediate access to large amounts of information across a wide range of resources and 
be able to undertake a range of analyses on this information for a range of possible scenarios. During the re-
sponse stage unrestricted access will be required. Appropriate access permissions would be needed. The full 
range of data and analaysis applications need to be available at relevant levels of detail. The speed of analy-
sis and response would be inproved if networks of sensors, CCTV and public media were available and inte-
grated with the analytical models. For example, analytical models of flooding could be compared with actual 
data to ensure that the analyses, and hence the decisions based up them, reflect what is really happening. This 
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is and ideal use of augmented reality systems to simplify comparisons between predicted and actual results. 
An important feature of the response to the Brisbane floods in 2011 was the “mud army” (Courier Mail, 
2012). Over the first weekend after the floods thousands of people volunteered to assist with cleaning up ar-
eas that had been flooded. These efforts continued on a smaller scale for several months afterwards. On the 
first day the mud army was well utilized, but as areas were cleaned up it was much more difficult to coordi-
nate efforts and the efficiency fell away. This is an area were social media could be applied effectively to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the effort. 
Rebuilding covers the considered repair, demolition and possibly relocation of assets undertaken after the 
immediate impacts of an event have been dealt with. The types of information required for rebuilding are 
similar to the planning stage. However, it would be expected that the values used for assessing the various 
risk factors were revised in the light of the disaster. The ability to search the virtual models of assets to locate 
details that have been identified as dubious in the recent event would simplify the planning of rebuilding 
tasks. Different types of analysis tools may also be needed to support decision making about damaged assets, 
such as whether to repair or demolish the asset. If there is consideration given to relocation/rebuilding of an 
asset in a different location to improve the risk considerations then the information and tools used for de-
signing new assets would obviously be appropriate. 
All of the information required above is of little use if it is not up-to-date and accurate. Asset owners could 
maintain the currency of the data on their assets through integration with their asset management systems. 
Accurate and appropriate data captured at the handover of a new asset to the owner followed by continued 
updating of the data as work orders and maintenance activities are undertaken would achieve this. Maintain-
ing information about the building stock across a city would require an interface between the planning and 
building approvals processes and the city models. Since infrastructure projects are not subject to the same 
approvals process and there are often multiple stakeholders (i.e. local, state and federal governments) 
maintenance of accurate information is more problematic and would required a willingness of all parties to 
cooperate. 
Before the proposed software architecture that would support the above use scenarios is described, the 
lifetime of the data about assets needs to be considered with respect to the software systems that will contain 
it. The lifetime of many built assets exceeds 50 years and in many cases exceeds centuries. Given that com-
mercial computing has only existed for just over 60 years and personal computers for a little over 30 years, 
consideration must be given to the availability of data over the lifetime of the asset(s) given that technology 
will change significantly between the initial construction of an asset and its demolition. One of the core re-
quirements to support data over thse time periods is the use of open standards to allow data to be moved be-
tween databases, software and hardware systems. The most widely used open standards currently used to 
support the assets discussed herein are the STEP standards (ISO), the IFCs (Industry Foundation Classes) 
(buildingSMART, 2013) and CityGML (OGC, 2013). These all support the encoding of data as clear text 
encoding. This means that the data will be accessible by any computer system that has a translator from one 
of these open formats into its internal format. Translators are then required to export edited data out to one of 
the open formats. While it is expected that the information needed to manage both individual assets and as-
sets spread over a region will be stored in proprietary formats, there is a need to be able to export in open 
formats to maintain longevity of data to match the assets that they represent. 
The type of software system that is described hereunder is a specialization of data intensive engineering 
software. Morris et al (1992) discuss many of the features that are necessary to support engineering decision 
making, such as support for versioning, schema evolution, schema integration, concurrency control, data dis-
tribution and system management. The overall software architecture is shown in figure 2 
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Figure 2: Software Architecture to Support Disaster Planning and Response. 
 
The technical infrastructure that is necessary to support the workflows described above needs to be flexi-
ble to support the differences described in the workflows. The data lies at the lowest level. Access control 
sits above this. The problem representation, analytical packages and alternatives are in the layer above with a 
visualization interface sitting at the top and providing the user interface to the other components. 
The data layer consists of a series of databases which store the data. Conceptually, these could be consid-
ered as being one per government department/company. These would have the appropriate access control to 
datasets. The AURIN project (http://aurin.org.au) is examining issues of data access control that are relevant 
to this type of situation. Under an emergency response situation access control could be relaxed to allow a 
core response team to access information on an as needed basis. Free and open exchange amongst the re-
sponse team members is obviously desirable. Given that response groups, data sources and software are 
likely to be put together in response to particular aspects of a disaster, security and access control would need 
to be chiefly maintained by the network connecting the computer hardware. The “mashed” database is in-
tended for use in response mode where the team may bring together multiple datasets and will want to cache 
large datasets generated through queries or analyses. Given that these will be generated under time pressure 
it would be potentially dangerous to allow data to be written back to the source datasets. 
The “scenario definition” component allows definition of the parameters of the problem that is being 
tackled. This is an analytical engine which merges systems description, parametric solver and 2D/3D geo-
metric modeling capabilities. Aspects of it can be seen in Matlab, Mathematica, WhatIf (Klosterman, 1999), 
GIS and BIM systems. 
The analytics component indicates where a suite of analysis tools is attached. This would comprise a range 
of tools including capabilities such as finite element analysis, computational fluid dynamcs, linear and 
non-linear equation solvers. 
The results of user interaction are stored as “proposals”. Each problem formulation would be run against a 
series of parameters. The settings for particular problem descriptions and the results would each be stored as 
a separate proposal that can be retrieved individually at the end of a series of runs. This supports iterative 
progression through the solution space of particular probems, with the possibility to return to various inter-
mediate positions and to test other branches of a decvision network. 
The final componenet is the visualization interface. This is the major interface between the user and the 
software components. This is deliberately distinct from the underlying software components, following the 
philosophy of the unix X-windows approach, where the windowing system can support multiple users look-
ing at the same visual interface from different screens. This supports collaboration through providing the 
ability for people who are not co-located to share and interact over particular aspects of a problem. It also 
provides a mechanism for lightweight hardware, such as tablets used in the field, to access high powered 
computing facilities tht are necessary to understand developments in possibly remote locations. In current 
terminology this could be conserved as “shared access over the cloud” but the underlying technology is not 
new. 
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(6) CONCLUSION  
Two aspects of regional resilience were presented – social and technological.  
The major social factors in building resilience in communities are to build a sense of community through a 
range of place-based interactions within the community itself. The use of FIFO workers in mining and infra-
structure developments mitigates directly against the social structures required to build a sense of community 
through their work practices and restraints on social interaction with the resident community. Additional 
factors are open access to information about the community and the impact of social media in supporting 
communication within the community. 
The technological sections proposed a software architecture that supports the four identified stages of disas-
ter response. While recognizing that portions of this functionality exist in currently available software there 
is no known implementation of this system. The distinguishing features are: 
1. Separation of the visual user interface from the analysis and scenario definition functions to allow 
users who are not co-located to collaborate on decision making; 
2. Providing levels of security access that can be reduced during response to disasters to simplify sup-
port for response activities; 
3. Providing explicit support for storing alternative proposals as a problem is analysed; 
4. Support for open standards for data storage and exchange, recognizing the difference in life expec-
tancy of built environment assets and computer systems. 
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